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power to strike a contract provision which it finds to be "unconscionable.""2 The second alternative would be for the courts to allow recovery
based upon strict tort liability." This cause of action is independent of
implied warranty liability and cannot be disclaimed.- 4
With the decision in the instant case, Florida seems to have now
given full recognition to Lord Ellenborough's cogent statement. No longer
will a manufacturer immunize itself from liability by inserting a vague
phrase in a contract of sale. Henceforth, the only "lemons" Florida
consumers must accept will be the agricultural variety.
RONALD WM. SABO

LEVY AND SALE UNDER JUDGMENT EXECUTION ON
STOCK IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
CORPORATIONS
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the sale of their stock in a professional service corporation to satisfy a judgment against them individually.
The chancellor permanently enjoined the sale of the stock on the basis of
Florida Statutes, sections 621.09 and 621.11.1 The Third District Court
32. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-302 (1965). However, it has not yet been held by any decision
which this writer is aware of, that a court may use this section to void a disclaimer which
meets the requirements set forth in the U.C.C. At least one legal writer has taken the position that such a valid disclaimer cannot be struck by the courts:
[lilt appears to be a matter of common assumption that section 2-302 is applicable
to warranty disclaimers. I find this frankly, incredible. Here is 2-316 which sets
forth clear, specific and anything but easy-to-meet standards for disclaiming warranties. It is a highly detailed section, the comments to which disclose full awareness
of the problems at hand. It contains no reference of any kind to section 2-302, although nine other sections of article 2 contain such references. In such circumstances
the usually bland assumptions that a disclaimer which meets the requirements of
2-316 might still be strikable as "unconscionable" under 2-302 seems explainable if
at all, as oversight, wishful thinking or (in a rare case) attempted sneakiness. (footnotes omitted)
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 523 (1967).
At least one court has inferentially taken the same view. Chronologically, the case was similar
to the instant one in that the U.C.C. was not in effect when the cause of action arose, but it
was when the case was decided. There the court refused to strike the disclaimer as contrary to
public policy because they felt the legislature had established public policy when it adopted
the U.C.C. which specifically declared that warranties may be disclaimed. Murray v. Marshall
Oldsmobile, Inc., Va. -,
154 S.E.2d 140 (1967).
33. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer ....
34. Id., comment m at 355.
1. No corporation organized under the provisions of this act may issue any of its
capital stock to anyone other than an individual who is duly licensed or otherwise
legally authorized to render the same specific professional services as those for which
the corporation was incorporated.
FLA. STAT. § 621.09 (1965).
No shareholder of a corporation organized under this act may sell or transfer his

1967]

CASES NOTED

of Appeal reversed,2 and certified a question to the Florida Supreme
Court.3 On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, held, affirmed: The

stock in a professional service corporation is not exempt from levy and
sale, under execution of a judgment against some of its shareholders, by
a non-professional judgment creditor. Street v. Sugerman, 202 So.2d 749
(Fla. 1967).
Professional service corporations 4 are a recent development in the
law, and are the result of the demand by professionals for equality of tax
treatment with non-professionals." Florida's Professional Service Corporation Act' is typical of many statutes recently passed in other states.7 None
shares in such corporation except to another individual who is eligible to be a shareholder of such corporation, and such sale or transfer may be made only after the
same shall have been approved, at a stockholders meeting specially called for such
purpose ....
FLA. STAT. § 621.11 (1965).
The Florida legislature amended § 621.11 in 1967 to eliminate the need for stockholders'
approval of a sale or transfer of shares by an individual stockholder, Fla. Laws 1967, ch.
67-590 § 3. That amendment should not have any effect on this decision, but rather may
strengthen it.
2. Sugerman v. Street, 198 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
3. Whether stock owned by attorney-shareholders in a professional service corporation is exempt from levy and sale, under execution, as a result of a judgment against
some of the shareholders, by a non-professional judgment creditor.
Street v. Sugerman, 202 So.2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1967).
4. Before the advent of the Professional service corporation, the members of the learned
professions could not practice as or through a corporation. This bar was due to the personal
nature of the services rendered, and the fear that a sloppy workman would hide behind the
shield of limited corporate liability. To avoid this problem, the Florida legislature provided
that:
[Any officer, agent, or employee of a corporation organized under this act shall be
personally liable and accountable only for negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct
committed by him or by any person under his direct supervision and control, while
rendering professional service on behalf of the corporation to the person for whom
such professional services were being rendered; and provided further that the personal liability of shareholders . . . in their capacity as shareholders . . . shall be no
greater in any aspect than that of a shareholder-employee of a [normal business]
corporation .... (emphasis supplied).
FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1965) as amended, Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-590 § 2. But, the corporate
veil still exists as to negligent acts by persons not under "his direct supervision and control"
or for corporate debts.
5. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961), where the Florida Supreme Court
intimated that the only purpose for these statutes was to allow professionals the benefits of
corporate tax treatment.
The principle advantage of corporate tax treatment is the availability of pension funds
for the employees of the corporation under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404. Under this provision, the corporation can deduct the premiums paid under a qualified plan, but the employee does not have to pay income tax on the premiums paid for him. These pension funds
are not available to a partnership since a partner could not be considered an emloyee in
relation to the partnership. Whether or not these professional service corporations will be
treated as corporations for tax purposes depends on future developments in the law and
rulings by the Internal Revenue Service. See note 25 infra. For a discussion of corporate tax
treatment and. the professional service corporation see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 383 (1965);
Buchmann and Bearden, The Professional Service Corporation-A New Business Entity, 16
U. Mi MI L. REV. 1 (1961).
6. FiA. STAT. ch. 621 (1965).

7. E.g., IDAirO CODE tit. 30 ch. 13 (1967); MIcH. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.221-.253
(1967) ; REv. CODE OF MONT. tit. 15 ch. 21 (1967) ; CODE OF VA. tit. 54 ch. 25 (1967).
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of these statutes provide for the possibility of a forced sale of an individual's stock in the corporation under a judgment execution,8 although
all of them provide that only duly licensed or otherwise legally qualified
individuals may own stock in the corporation.' The case law is practically
nonexistent, and this specific question is one of first impression.' 0
The Florida Supreme Court based its decision on public policy,"
but the roots of the decision can be found in prior partnership law. Under
Florida law, a partner's interest is subject to levy and sale under judgment execution.' 2 Furthermore, once the interest is sold, the partnership
is at an end, and the purchaser may maintain a bill in equity to have the
partnership dissolved and an accounting made of his interest.' It was
therefore only natural for the Florida Supreme Court, when faced with
a business organization so closely resembling a partnership, 4 to apply
reasoning to reach a result consistent with that of a debtor-partner in a
partnership.
Whether or not other states will follow Florida's lead when faced
with this question is a matter of speculation. States which have adopted
the Uniform Partnership Act' 5 are not subject to the same public policy
8. See note 7 supra.
9. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1308 (1967); MICH. COmP LAWS ANN. § 450.230 (1967); REV.
CODE OF MONT. § 15-2111 (1967) ; CODE OF VA. § 54-888 (1967).
10. Approximately thirty states have professional service corporation statutes, but the
earliest of these was enacted in 1951, and most of the statutes were enacted after 1961. The
lack of cases on the subject is due to the recent passage of the statutes.
11. The privilege of incorporation was most definitely not created or extended in
order that those availing themselves of the benefits could be cloaked with an immunity inimical to legal order and public interest.
Street v. Sugerman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967). The Florida Supreme Court cited with
approval the Third District Court of Appeal's opinion that:
Such a holding could afford professionals a shelter for their assets, which appears to
be inconsistent with the spirit of the [professional service corporation] act. We see
no reason to carve out a judicial "no man's land" for shareholders in a professional
corporation which is not available to shareholders in non-professional groups.
Sugerman v. Street, 198 So.2d 57, 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). Would a charging order on the
stockholder's interest create a "judicial no man's land?" See note 17 infra.
12. "The language of the statute is sufficiently comprehensive to authorize a sale under
execution of the judgment debtor's partnership interest in the firm." B.A. Lott, Inc. v.
Padgett, 153 Fla. 308, 309, 14 So.2d 669, 670 (1943).
13. Once that interest is sold the partnership is at an end and the purchaser at execution sale becomes the owner of the property interest of the judgment debtor ....
There can be little dispute but that the execution purchaser is authorized to maintain a bill in equity to have his newly acquired property interest ascertained and
adjudicated, and the property sold, the partnership debts paid, and the surplus
divided between the parties in accordance with their proportionate interests.
B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 308, 309, 14 So.2d 669, 670 (1943)..
14. The Florida Professional Service Corporation may so closely resemble a partnership
as to he taxed as one. See note 25 infra.
15. Forty states plus the District of Columbia have adopted the UNnFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT. 7 U.L.A. Partnership Table III (Supp. 1967). Besides Florida, the only states which
have not adopted the U.P.A. while adopting a professional service corporation statute are
Alabama, Georgia, and Kansas. Of these, Georgia definitely follows the U.P.A. view, Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Pendergrass Banking Co., 164 Ga. 302, 138 S.E. 223 (1927).
Alabama and Kansas have no definite rulings on the subject, although Kansas may follow
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considerations as Florida. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, a partner's
interest is not subject to attachment or execution,' 6 but rather is subject
to a charging order, which entitles the creditor to the partner's share of
the income.' 7 The charging order does not dissolve the partnership as a
matter of law.'" The creditor is held to be amply protected under this provision. 9 Therefore, states under the Uniform Partnership Act may analogize their Professional Corporation Act to their existing partnership law
and thereby subject a stockholder's interest to a charging order rather
than a levy and sale under judgment execution.
The major question generated by this decision is, "what are the
consequences if a non-professional purchases the stock at the judgment
sale?" The holding of the stock by a non-professional would be inconsistent with section 621.09 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that
only authorized professionals in the same field may own stock in the
corporation.2 ° The Florida Supreme Court suggested, although not ruling
on the point, that the only alternative open to the corporation was to
dissolve. 2 ' This result would be consistent with the result2 under prior
partnership law,22 and may be the only logical possibility.
the U.P.A. view, see Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank v. Lemley, 105 Kan. 15, 181 P. 606
(1919) ; Gaynes v. Conn, 185 Kan. 655, 347 P.2d 458 (1959).
16. "A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or
execution, except on a claim against the partnership." U.P.A. § 25(2)(c); Bushmiaer v.
United States, 146 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Ark. 1956) (applying Arkansas law); Sherwood v.
Jackson, 121 Cal. App. 354, 8 P.2d 943 (1932) ; Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 133
Pa. Super. 181, 2 A.2d 553 (1938).
17. On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner,
the court . . .may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the
unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may then or
later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any other money due or
to fall due to him in respect of the partnership ....
U.P.A. § 28(1).
18. Scott v. Platt, 177 Ore. 515, 163 P.2d 293 (1945).
19. "[A] creditor is fully protected by the power of a court of competent jurisdiction
to charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of such
judgment debt." Sherwood v. Jackson, 121 Cal. App. 354, 357, 8 P.2d 943, 944 (1932).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. It is our impression that this matter could no doubt be effectively dealt with
under the provision for dissolution set forth in Chapter 608, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
[Corporate code] or Chapter 621, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., or by a bill in equity in
aid of execution.
Street v. Sugerman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967).
22. Under prior partnership law, when a partner's interest was attached, the partnership
was at an end, and the partnership would dissolve or the creditor could bring a bill in
equity to have it dissolved. B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 308, 14 So.2d 669 (1943).
23. If any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation organized under
this act who has been rendering professional service to the public becomes legally
disqualified to render such professional services within this State, . . . he shall
sever . . . all financial interests in such corporation forthwith. A corporation's
failure to require compliance with this provision shall constitute a ground for the
forfeiture of its articles of incorporation and its dissolution.
FLA. STAT. § 621.10 (1965).
While the specific language of Section 621.10 speaks in terms of the legal disqualification of a shareholder "who has been rendering professional service," it is only
logical to infer that the same standard of determination as to who may be an
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Therefore, stock in a professional service corporation is subject to
levy and sale under judgment execution to the same extent as ordinary
corporate stock.2 ' However, the added feature of a possible forced dissolution may destroy an essential element for an organization to be taxed
as a corporation, that is, continuity of life, and result in Florida's professional service corporations being taxed as partnerships.2 If this should
happen, the essential purpose of the statute-to give to professionals the
advantages of corporate tax treatment-would be destroyed.
WILLIAM L. SAX

REMOVAL DENIED: THE SURVIVAL OF THE VOLUNTARYINVOLUNTARY RULE
The plaintiff, a citizen of Mississippi, filed a suit in a Mississippi
state trial court against two defendants: one a New York corporation,'
and the other its employee, a resident of Mississippi. The court entered
a directed verdict in favor of the resident' defendant. The remaining nonresident defendant immediately filed a petition for removal in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi contending
authorized stockholder would serve to preclude as a stockholder any person not a
professional within the meaning of the statute. This would be the case regardless of
the manner in which a nonprofessional happened to legally acquire shares of stock
in a professional service corporation.
Street v. Sugerman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967).
Even if Florida Statute § 621.10 was not to apply, the inconsistency between a nonprofessional's holding of stock which only professionals may hold per Florida Statute
§ 621.09 would have to be resolved, and certainly not by avoiding the statute.
24. "Lands and tenements, goods and chattels, equities of redemption in real and personal property, and stock in corporations shall be subject to levy and sale under execution."
FLA. STAT. § 55.20 (1965) (emphasis supplied).
25. A professional service organization is treated as a corporation . . . only if it has
sufficient corporate characteristics to be classifiable as a corporation ... rather than
as a partnership or proprietorship.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (i) (1965).
There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation
which, taken together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i)
Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom,
(iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate
debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. (emphasis supplied).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (1) (1960).
Since many of these characteristics are common to both a partnership and a corporation, only the strictly corporate characteristics are determinative. Therefore, each characteristic is important in determining the status of a corporation for tax purposes, and lack of
one characteristic could be determinative of the question.
1. New York is Dreyfus' place of incorporation and also its principal place of business.
For both of these reasons, Dreyfus is a citizen of New York for the purposes of removal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
2. While we recognize that residency is not the equivalent of citizenship, hereinafter
defendants will frequently be designated either as "resident" or "nonresident".

